For the most part, judges read laws proscribing the killing of persons to prohibit the killing of slaves.ll In many of these cases, courts stressed slaves' essential humanity and -with a lack of irony that astonishes the modern sensibility -reflected on the necessity of so determining a slave's legal personality to maintain a civilized, decent society.12 However, the ability of judges to inject their own views on the legal personhood of slaves declined throughout the nineteenth century, as emerging slave codes created a body of statutory rules that rendered common law adjudication less necessary.13 These rules generally sidestepped the issue of legal personality by making it a felony to kill a slave, rather than by taking a position on whether slaves counted as persons for the purpose of the common law crime of murder.
The law also treated slaves as persons by holding them as publicly accountable for their crimes as nonslaves.14 This broad characterization of slaves' legal personhood permitted an anomalous litigation tactic in which slaves argued that they were not legal "persons" and that they were therefore outside the ambit of the criminal law. In United States v. Amy,15 for example, a young slave girl stood accused of stealing a letter from a post office in violation of a federal act that prescribed two years' imprisonment for "any person" who committed such an offense.16 To Amy's argument that she was not a legal person because she was a slave, the prosecutor rejoined, "I cannot prove more plainly that the prisoner is a person, a natural person, at least, than to ask your honors to look at her. There she is."17 Sitting as a circuit justice, Chief Justice Taney rejected Amy's reasoning and embraced the robust view of slave personhood, stating that he could conceive of "no 12 Whether these opinions actually did reflect such generous spirits on the part of their authors is questionable. Cf. ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 158-60 (I99i) (questioning whether judges' opinions reflected community views or had any precedential weight). Here, though, the rhetorical value of the opinions' expression of slaves' legal personhood is the real issue, and that value is amply reflected in these documents. See id. at 129-3I. 13 The scattershot nature of the law of persons diminished during the final few decades of American slavery, as slave codes replaced common law as the primary source of law. See Tushnet, supra note II, at 131-37 (1975 Judges sometimes adopted a narrow view of slave personhood, reading laws that protected "persons" as excluding slaves. For example, while most jurisdictions criminalized the killing of slaves, they held that the common law of assault and battery, which generally prohibited attacks on persons, did not apply to slaves. Judges particularly concluded as much in the context of owners' beating their slaves. Both Virginia19 and North Carolina20 courts held that owners who severely and unjustifiably beat their slaves could not be indicted under the common law. Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that assaults against slaves by certain nonowners generally fell outside the ambit of the common law,21 though the owners of the slaves could recover against the perpetrators of the assault for the resulting loss of property value.22
In the civil context, courts tended to adopt the narrow version of slave personhood, reading general grants to persons of civil, social, and political rights as excluding slaves.23 Rather than stating that slaves were not legal persons for the purpose of a particular law, judges tended to make arguments based on the nature of slavery in ruling that slaves could not enjoy the general grants of rights and privileges that other humans enjoyed. A final strategy -and one that prevails in several states that do not formally regard fetuses as persons for the purposes of their murder laws -is to penalize assaults against pregnant women that result in either miscarriage or injury to the fetus. In Delaware, for example, public outrage at a man who strangled his pregnant wife led to the swift passage of a law making it a felony to abuse or assault a pregnant woman.78 In one sense, these statutes do not address the issue of personhood nearly as directly as does common law interpretation of the term "person" in murder laws, because they do not entail ongoing public considerations of and conclusions about legal personhood. In some cases, courts have assumed that all fetuses are human. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the strongest version of this approach in Cass, when it regarded the issue as resolved by When courts insist that holdings on fetal personality have no extralegal implications, they appear to protest too much. If courts were truly confident that they could manipulate and interpret personhood simply as a legal fiction, no protestations to the contrary would be necessary.l19 Judges' reluctance to engage these issues itself suggests that denying or granting legal personality to fetuses sends a strong message about the state's valuation of fetal life, either by countenancing the visceral moral wrong of feticide'20 or by threatening the foundational assumptions of abortion rights.'21 The ambivalence and anxiety that courts experience in attempting to determine whether fetuses are legal 115 121 Cf Smith, supra note 68, at 1868-69 (discussing opposition to a proposed fetal homicide bill in Kansas because it defined fetuses as "persons" so broadly that it would effectively have classified abortion as first-degree murder). persons reflect and express society's own strong feelings regarding this issue. In at least three states, for example, when courts defined fetuses out of murder statutes, the public reacted with outrage, and state legislatures passed responsive legislation within two months.122 The legal personality of fetuses remains tied so deeply to the social debate over fetal humanity that courts cannot manipulate the legal category "person" without expressing certain values, whether they want to or not.123
The Too frequently the extension of corporate constitutional rights is a zero-sum game that diminishes the rights and powers of real individuals. Fourth amendment rights applied to the corporation diminish the individual's rights to live in an unpolluted world or to enjoy privacy. The corporate exercise of first amendment rights frustrates the individual's right to participate equally in democratic elections, to pay reasonable utility rates, and to live in a toxin-free environment. Equality of constitutional rights plus an inequality of legislated and de facto powers leads inexorably to the supremacy of artificial over real persons. Id. at 658. whereby language does not merely describe a state of affairs, but helps bring that state of affairs into existence.132
C. Personhood and the Problem of Status
Legal personhood is more than a metaphor; it becomes, in many cases, law's repository for expressions of anxiety about powerfully divisive social issues. In the antebellum South, the rhetoric of personhood reflected the moral ambivalence of a society that called itself democratic while still owning slaves. In the context of feticide, the doctrinal confusion regarding legal personhood evidences the twomindedness of a society that finds fetal murder abhorrent even as it desires to protect the autonomy of pregnant women. In debates about corporate personhood, lasting terminological anxiety expresses the tension between the desire to stimulate the economy by granting constitutional protections to corporations and the fear that unchecked corporate growth may have socially deleterious effects or that unchecked recognition of corporate personhood may cheapen our own.
Courts' treatment of legal personhood communicates anxiety not only about divisive social issues, but also about the operation of law itself. In highly individualistic modern American legal culture, status distinctions seem to be embarrassing remnants of an illiberal past. However, when courts and legislatures engage problems of legal personhood, they are necessarily interpreting and applying very fundamental notions of status. The law of the person, and especially courts' ambivalence about it, exposes the uncomfortable but inescapable place of status distinctions in even the most progressive legal systems.
The reluctance of American courts to manipulate status distinctions openly has deep roots. Sir Henry Maine famously articulated one strand of that reluctance when he formulated his foundational theory that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movementfrom Status to Contract."133 Maine argued that ancient law regarded the basic unit of society as the collective, so much so that the individual was subsumed by a series of status distinctions, each of which was transmitted between generations.134 The progression of legal culture realized a shift from status as the basis of rights to an individual capability to transmit property on a personal, contractual ba-132 See Schane, supra note 31, at 577-78 ("In a like manner, the Supreme Court, in declaring that it deemed a corporation to be a citizen, by its use of this word, brought to fruition the new legal status so described."); cf Mayer, supra note 32, at 650 ("Behind doctrines of commercial property and the free market of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the corporation as a person, entitled to all the rights of real humans."). The Fourteenth Amendment is a distinctively American manifestation of the great move from a more status-based to a more individualfocused legal system. The status distinctions on which slavery depended rendered hypocritical the egalitarian aspirations of the founding of the American republic. The Fourteenth Amendment repudiated these distinctions-at least distinctions made on the basis of racein the apparent hope of creating a body of law in which personhood had a single, universal meaning.'36
The major jurisprudential movements of the twentieth century also shed light on the law's reluctance to discuss personhood openly. The modernist/legal-realist approach (at least in its second, more skeptical strand)'37 denies the capacity of law to use language to embody an abstraction like "person" independently of social meaning and influence;'38 postmodern legal thought goes a step further, rejecting the possibility of ever overcoming the limitations of social context and language.l39 Both of these perspectives emphasize the centrality of individual experience, rather than connection with overarching institutions or beliefs, as a means to the good life.140 Hence, the very project of the law, which depends on metaphors to make sense of its rules and to justify its use of force, is as unstable as it has ever been. It is not surprising, then, that in a legal culture characterized by such profound reluctance to recognize universal notions of the person, ascribing any transcendent meaning to personhood -such as a transsubstantive definition of legal personality -seems fraught with troubling normative implications. '14 Courts' anxiety about manipulating legal personhood is a product of these trends. However much American legal consciousness may express an inclination to reject status distinctions, particularly in the case of legal personality, to have a law is to have an object on which that 135 The law of the person is fraught with deep ambiguity and significant tension, and the problem extends far beyond the standard interpretive difficulties attending the meaning of legal metaphors. The law's use of the fiction "person" to define its object inevitably evokes the anxiety that accompanies social definitions of personhood. This difficulty is exacerbated by the tension between our strongly individualist legal culture and the utter dependence of law on this metaphor. Moreover, social anxiety about personhood matters not only because it exposes ambivalence within the law, but also because the law, through its expressive dimension, signals norms and values that influence ideas and opinions about personhood.
This anxiety is likely to become more acute. Technological and economic progress promise to muddy further the waters of personhood, calling into question the once-stable notion of who counts as a living human. On one front, animal rights theorists142 and activists143 argue that the human/nonhuman distinction is founded on illegitimate notions of an absolute hierarchy of worth that places humans above other animals. On another, technology may soon enable the creation of entities that are neither clearly human nor nonhuman, such as transgenic animals,'44 or that closely replicate human consciousness, such as artificially intelligent beings.'45
The grossly undertheorized character of this field suggests that the problem merits more attention. Such attention would not only aid in understanding the scope and meaning of the law's use of the fiction "person" to define its object, but -considering this metaphor's extralegal implications -would also help law contribute more fully to social dialogue about what it means to be human. 
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